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B2B Unfair Trade Practices and EU Competition Law 
EU competition law appears to interpret fairness in B2B trade relations as “equal 
opportunities to trade” for market actors. A positive and pragmatic inquiry into 
the relevant regulations, cases and doctrines support that approach. This 
contribution suggests a new definition for these practices under EU competition 
law. Accordingly, any trade practice representing supremacy in bargaining power 
‒ usually dominance ‒ and distorting the equal opportunity to trade of one or 
more trading partners could be conceived as unfair trade practices (UTPs) under 
EU competition law. Thus, these practices restrict competition according to EU 
competition law. Indeed, the EU Commission, Parliament and many Member 
States have emphasized the restrictive effects of UTPs even when practiced by 
non-dominant undertakings. UTPs could include all kinds of trade practices 
toward trading partners, regardless of the industry and environment in which they 
occur, whether online or offline. This definition can also relieve competition 
lawyers from inefficient exploitative/exclusionary abusive conduct divisions.  
Keywords: unfair trade practices; fairness; equal opportunity to trade; business to 
business relations; online platform to business relations 
I. Introduction 
Businesses have finally received attention from the EU authorities as targets of unfair 
trade practices (UTPs) in the current decade. Consumers have always been assumed to 
be the main victim of UTPs due to their position in relation to businesses. However, 
market reality suggests otherwise.  
B2B UTPs lack harmonized and inclusive action at the EU level,1 although this 
issue appears to capture the Commission’s attention periodically. Nevertheless, EU 
competition law appears always to have been competent to deal with this matter to a 
considerable extent. Article 102 TFEU is a solid basis for researching and investigating 
                                                 
1 See further in the third and fourth sections about action at the EU level. 
  
B2B UTPs. Disparity in bargaining power, in the form of dominance, is central to Article 
102, whether a single undertaking or a group of undertakings collectively possess this 
power.  EU case law on Article 102 illustrates potential to intervene in B2B UTPs. 
Accordingly, assessing the relevant case law is indispensable to demonstrating how B2B 
UTPs are reflected under Article 102. Significantly, determining what EU competition 
law means by “fair” or “unfair” practices is paramount for understanding the relationship 
between Article 102 and UTPs.  
Therefore, this contribution aims to answer two questions central to the study of 
UTPs. Firstly, how does “fairness”, concerning businesses, appear in the mirror of EU 
competition law? And secondly, since not all types of UTPs would fall within the scope 
of EU competition law, what kind of competition-restrictive UTPs relating to businesses 
would be caught by EU competition law, in particular Article 102?  
To answer these questions, this contribution adopts a pragmatic and positive 
approach. This, firstly, appears more effective in tackling the complexity and ‒ 
allegedly ‒ vagueness of notions such as “fairness”. Secondly, reviewing the relevant 
cases is the most plausible ‒ if not the only ‒ way to study UTPs. Besides, the legal 
dogmatic method has been adopted, which involved studying the relevant regulations, 
directives, guidelines, case law, available literature and doctrines. 
The text is divided into three main sections followed by a conclusion. Section II 
deals with the first question, thus clarifying the meaning of fairness in relation to 
businesses. Section III studies examples of UTPs in EU competition law, drawn from 
the available case law. Section IV reflects UTPs in online platform-business relations. 
These are examined separately due, firstly, to the exceptional characteristics of online 
platform-business models and, secondly, to the different approach by the EU 
Commission regarding UTPs in the online environment, which eventually resulted in 
  
regulatory action. Otherwise, UTPs appear to be much the same regardless of the type 
of industry in which they are practised. 
II. Does EU Competition Law Protect Fairness? 
Fairness as a “multidimensional concept”2 is one of the most challenging notions to 
define. This intricate notion has undergone different interpretations based on distinct 
contexts.3 In the EU, it is reflected in various subsets of law, specifically consumer,4 
contract5 and competition law.6 Interestingly, fairness emerges in all fields as involving 
a contrast between power and weakness. 
Even though some authors find it almost impossible to define fairness in 
different fields of law,7 there appears to be a quasi-consensus on how it is understood, 
not defined, in competition law. The common understanding of fairness may not 
                                                 
2 Munda Giuseppe, ‘Dealing with Fairness in Public Policy Analysis: A Methodological 
Framework’ (2017) Publications Office of the European Union 1, 5 
 <http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC107843/jrc107843_smce-ia-
fairness.pdf> accessed 11 June 2018. 
3 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and 
Principles of Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2011) 21. 
4 Council Directive (EEC) 93/13/ on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts [1993] OJ L95/29; 
Council Directive (EC) 2005/29/ on Unfair Commercial Practices [2005] OJ L149/22. 
5 Ole Lando and Hugh Beal (eds), The Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I & II, (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International 2000); Christian von Bar and others (eds), ‘Principles, 
definitions and Model Rules of European Private law ‒ Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR)’ (Outline Edition, European Law Publishers 2009) 
<https://sakig.pl/uploads/upfiles/moot/dfcr.pdf>  accessed 11 June 2018. 
6 Specifically Art.102 TFEU. 
7 Pinar Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition law: Law and Economic Approach 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing 2012) 181‒82, 204; Maurits Dolmans and Wanjie Lin, ‘Fairness 
and competition law: A fairness paradox’ (2017) 4 Concurrences 1, 5 and 20. Mainly due 
to the allegation of being a subjective and vague concept. 
  
necessarily provide a comprehensive definition, but to some extent solves the problem 
concerning the difficulty or impossibility of suggesting an exhaustive definition.8 
Accordingly, a more pragmatic and positive approach is pursued here rather than a 
theoretical and normative one. 
Fairness is predominantly intertwined with “equal opportunities”9 for different 
actors in the market. At any rate, striving for equal opportunity does not ensure an equal 
                                                 
8 Indeed, we have no choice but to agree, while compromising on certain matters so that we can 
proceed with the discussion, otherwise lawyers would have stopped at the start trying to 
define basic concepts such as law and never progressing any further. 
9 See Edwin J. Hughes, ‘The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and Why it Matters’ 
(1994) 77(2) Marquette Law Review 265, 283; Roger J. Van den Bergh & Peter D. 
Camesesca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective 
(Antwerpen, Intersentia 2001) 3; David J. Gerber, ‘Fairness in Competition Law: 
European And U.S. Experience’ (Conference on Fairness and Asian Competition Laws, 
Kyoto-Japan, March 2004) 6‒7, referring to the importance of values such as equality for 
Europe; Christian Ahlborn and A. Jorge Padilla, ‘From Fairness to Welfare: Implications 
for the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in Claus D. 
Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reform 
Approach to Article 85 EC (Hart Publishing 2007) 60; Nazzini (n 3)147‒48, even though 
the author introduced fairness as a test rather than as an objective; Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some 
Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law’ (2013) CLES Working 
Paper Series 3/2013 22, 31 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235875> accessed 11 June 2018; 
Wouter P.J. Wils, ‘The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the So-Called 
‘More Economic Approach’ to Abuse of Dominance’ (2014) 37 (4) World Competition 
405; Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo, ‘Competition Law as Fairness’ (2017) 8 Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 147‒48; Margrethe Vestager, ‘The New Age of 
Corporate Monopolies’ (presentation on Ted, 2017) 
<https://www.ted.com/talks/margrethe_vestager_the_new_age_of_corporate_monopolies/t
ranscript#t-647576> accessed 11 June 2018, mentioning ‘…competition on equal terms’; 
Doris Hildebrand, ‘The equality and social fairness objectives in EU competition law: The 
  
outcome;10 hence, fair and equal access to the market may result in “fair inequality”.11 
Accordingly, as long as there is “competition on the merits”, fairness and/or equal 
opportunity is achieved12; Because competition law aims to eliminate greed, not 
competition.13  
Considering various points of view on the role of fairness in EU competition 
law, there appear to be three main categories of opinions. Firstly, those who both deny 
the importance of fairness in this context ‒ fairness as it is ‒ and reject it as a proper 
goal for competition law in general ‒ fairness as it should be.14 Secondly, some authors 
admit the importance of fairness as it is; however, they criticize it and assert that its role 
is shrinking, and should be doing so, as happened in the USA.15 Thirdly, scholars who 
                                                 
European School of Thought’ (2017) 1 Concurrences 1, 2, the author emphasized equal 
distribution of wealth as well. 
10  Nazzini (n 3) 147‒48. 
11  Giuseppe (n 2) 5. 
12  Vestager (n 9); Johannes Laitenberger, Director-General for Competition, European 
Commission, ‘EU competition law in innovation and digital markets: fairness and the 
consumer welfare perspective’ (Hogan Lovells event, Brussels, October 2017); for a 
different view distinguishing competition on the merits from fairness, see Maurits and Lin, 
(n 7) 9. 
13 Thomas J. Horton, ‘Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective’ 
(2013) 44 McGeorge Law Review 847; Vestager (n 9). 
14 See e.g. Heike Schweitzer ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 
Sherman Act and Article 82 EC’ in Ehlermann and Marquis (eds) (n 9); Peter Behrens 
‘The Ordoliberal concept of “abuse” of a dominant position and its impact on Article 102 
TFEU’ (2015) 7/15 Institute for European Integration Working Paper 
<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120873/1/834998815.pdf> accessed 11 June 
2018 
15 See e.g. Van den Bergh and Camesesca (n 9) 6‒7; Ahlborn, and Padilla (n 9). 
  
embrace the role of fairness in EU competition law both as it is and as it should be.16 
Regardless of the controversial origin of fairness in EU competition law, according to 
different authors,17 this contribution emphasizes the role of fairness in EU competition 
law by adopting the third category of opinion.   
Considerable evidence has already been provided illustrating how and why 
discussing fairness is relevant to EU competition law.18 By demonstrating the most 
fundamental element of that evidence, this part of the article strives to construct other 
arguments in this context, while avoiding repetition. 
EU competition law should not be interpreted as a rootless segment of the EU 
legal system, which itself forms part of the European Community representing different 
values and goals. Although competition law is neither competent ‒ nor is supposed to ‒
protect all values and aims, some of those values and aims are relevant to the 
application of competition law. If the main purpose of the EU is to establish and protect 
the internal market, without public and private19 barriers for cross-border businesses, 
how can EU competition law be construed so as to disregard that aim? 
                                                 
16 See e.g. Hildebrand (n 9); Lamadrid de Pablo (n 9); and for similar opinions in US antitrust 
context see e.g. Hughes (n 9); Horton (n 13). 
17 Many authors claim that the Ordoliberal school of thought impressed EU competition law so 
that fairness became important as the individual’s rights were pivotal for Ordoliberals. See 
e.g. Ahlborn and Padilla (n 9) 63; Lianos (n 9) 24‒25; and for a different perspective see 
e.g. Schweitzer (n 14) 133‒35; Lianos (n 9) 26; Behrens (n 14). 
18 To avoid repeating here, see e.g.  Ahlborn and Padilla (n 9) 55‒74, even though the authors 
criticized EU competition law on this account; Lianos (n 9) 31‒54; Hildebrand (n 9). 
19 Schweitzer (n 14) 137.  
  
 Is it accurate to interpret competition law in the vacuum of economic analysis 
alone? Competition law is the most proper means20 to functionalize and protect the 
internal market. Although competition law should also take advantage of economic 
analysis, economists are supposed to assist lawyers, not to decide on their behalf. Since 
“fair competition”21 is indispensable to the EU “social market system”,22 EU 
competition law is likewise required to reflect that same system. Moreover, discussing 
the aims of competition law in general without specifying the jurisdiction could be 
misleading. Different competition laws around the globe may embrace substantial 
similarities, while their differences should not be underestimated. In particular, if 
competition law is understood as a means of achieving other goals, the diversity of 
different societies needs special attention. 
One important factor, less highlighted in EU competition-law scholarly works, is 
the dignity of fairness as an intrinsic value for social human beings. This issue has also 
been emphasized in other aspects of science and social science, from philosophy to 
biology.23 Some empirical studies have also demonstrated the importance of fairness 
and “social interest” in some human decision making ‒ according to different economic 
                                                 
20 For discussion of competition law as an aim by itself or as a means to achieve other aims, see 
Lianos (n 9) 37, (footnote 158). 
21 Vestager (n 9). 
22 See Commission, ‘Report on Competition Policy 2016’ COM (2017) 285 final, 2. It quoted 
from the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who recalled that 
“(a) fair playing field also means that in Europe, consumers are protected against cartels 
and abuses by powerful companies. (...) The Commission watches over this fairness. This 
is the social side of competition law. And this is what Europe stands for”. 
23 Horton (n 13) 839‒842. 
  
and competitive environments ‒ rather than “self-interest”.24 On the contrary, these 
studies have shown that in situations where fair play results in unfair outcomes to fair 
players ‒ because others benefit from unfair advantages ‒ the absence of sanctions 
increases the likelihood of unfair play.25 Hence, potent justification exists for regulating 
a competitive environment for the sake of social interest and fairness. 
Besides, fairness appears to be an undeniable value for different societies, to the 
extent that even those who claim efficiency as the sole goal of competition law do not 
deny the significance of fairness in general. They do not actually support the idea that 
fairness has competition law relevance, and they transfer the role to other subsets of 
law, such as contract, tort, and unfair competition law.26 This work casts doubt on that 
approach by asking how can we be selective in terms of our values? In brief, fairness is 
either important or it is not. But, if it is, then it cannot be valuable here, but not there.  
Furthermore, the EU still lacks coherent and complete regulations on various 
forms of unfair competition and trade practices protecting businesses.27 Accordingly, it 
is more comprehensible to delegate the burden to competition law, considering that 
                                                 
24 Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation’ 
(1999) 114 Quarterly Journal of Economics 817. 
25 ibid 819, 855‒56.  
26 Dolmans and Lin (n 7) 20; Horton (n 13) 832. 
27 Consumers have directives such as Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (n 4); Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L 
149/22. Regarding businesses, especially SMEs, the EU appears to be paying more 
attention by adopting Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2011/7/EU 
on combating late payment in commercial transactions (‘Late Payment Directive’) [2011] 
OJ L 48/1. 
  
protecting competition without its actors is an “empty slogan”.28 Likewise, Article 3(2) 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 authorizes EU Member States to apply stricter 
rules in terms of unilateral action and dominance; indeed, some Member States have 
already done so.29 This indicates EU regulators’ awareness about the credibility of 
fairness among EU Member States.  
To sum up so far, EU competition law implies fairness as an inseparable value 
intertwined in the body of law ‒ fairness forms part of concerns for free but fair 
competition in the market. Even though criticized as a concept for vagueness, legal 
uncertainty, subjectivity and for being differently understood from time to time and 
                                                 
28 Wolfgang Wurmnest, ‘The Reform of Article 82 EC in the Light of the “Economic 
Approach”’ in Mark O. Mackenrodt, Beatriz C. Gallego and Stefan Enchelmaier (eds), 
Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? 
(Springer 2008) 14. For the same argument that harm to competitors can result in harm to 
the structure of the market, see Peter Behrens, ‘Comment: Controlling dominance or 
protecting competition: from individual abuses to responsibility for competition’ in Hanns 
Ullrich (ed.), The Evolution of European Competition Law: whose Regulation, which 
Competition? (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2006) 228; Mor 
Bakhoum ‘Abuse Without Dominance in Competition Law: Abuse of Economic 
Dependence and its Interface with Abuse of Dominance’ (December 14, 2015) in Paul 
Nihoul et al. (eds), Abuse Regulation in Competition Law: Past, Present and Future 
(Edward Elgar, ASCOLA series) (forthcoming) 20‒22.   
29 Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Austria; see Jochen Glöckner, ‘Unfair Trading Practices in 
The Supply Chain and the Co-Ordination of European Contract, Competition and Unfair 
Competition Law in Their Reaction to Disparities in Bargaining Power’ (2017) 12 Journal 
of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 416, 419. For deeper elaboration in this matter, see 
Pranvera Këllezi, ‘Abuse below the Threshold of Dominance? Market Power, Market 
Dominance, and Abuse of Economic Dependence’ in Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz 
Conde Gallego, Stefan Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of Dominant Position: New 
Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 
2008). 
  
culture to culture,30 the importance of fairness cannot be disregarded. Moreover, in the 
context of EU competition law, certain courts and authorities with a considerable 
procedural background are directly involved in interpreting and clarifying the notion of 
fairness in practice.31 Thus, the need does not arise to ascertain the judgment of 
everyone around the world at different periods. The following, by a rather pragmatic 
approach, discusses legal proceedings of the EU courts and the Commission. 
III. Fairness in Practice (Examples of B2B UTPs) 
This section endeavours to clarify the role of fairness ‒ equal opportunity ‒ through EU 
competition law cases, which assists to provide a clearer understanding of B2B UTPs.32 
Whereas fairness – UTPs –  could be exposed to discussion in the case of cartels and 
concerted practices, on the other hand,33 in relation to direct rivals and final consumers 
of a dominant undertaking, it is worth recalling at the outset that the main focus here is 
on customers of dominant undertakings which are actually intermediary buyers. The 
section is divided into two main parts, due to the special situation of intermediary 
buyers in a market which varies from being purely trading partners to competitors of 
dominant undertakings at a different level of the market. Before examining each part, 
some preliminary issues need to be raised. 
The first issue concerns “exploitative abuse”, which in the literature34 ‒ while 
hardly discussed ‒ appears to be directly connected to a dominant undertaking’s 
                                                 
30 Dolmans and Lin (n 7) 2‒5. 
31 Laitenberger (n 12) 5. 
32 The suggested explanation of the B2B UTPs is provided in the conclusion. 
33 Gerber (n 9) 2‒3. 
34 See e.g. Carles E. Mosso and Stephen A. Ryan ‘Article 82 – Abuse of a Dominant Position’ 
in Jonathan Faull and Ali Nickpay (eds), The EC Law of Competition (Oxford University 
  
relations with customers and consumers. Accordingly, exploitation of 
customers/consumers and exclusion of competitors are familiar expressions. 
Exploitative abuses have been treated as the abandoned child of Article 102 TFEU, 
although at first Article 102 and abuse of a dominant position were interpreted as 
merely exploitative.35 The EU Commission has left no guideline, guidance or discussion 
paper on these abuses. Moreover, the majority of commentators are either reluctant to 
discuss this issue, or simply deny its relevance to competition law discourse, unless in 
exceptional circumstances.36 The main reasons expressed are the assertion that the 
market would “self-correct”37 over time, that exploitation lacks competition law 
                                                 
Press, Oxford 1999) 146; Daniel G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (4th ed. Oxford 
University Press 2003) 283; Bruce Lyons, ‘The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative 
Abuse’ in Konkurrensverket Swedish Competition Authority (ed), The Pros and Cons of 
High Prices (Kalmar 2007) 66; Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the Long-lost Soul of Art. 82 
EC’ (2009) 29 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 267; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, 
EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2014) 
367; Bakhoum (n 28)1; Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (Springer 2016) 
706.  
35 R Joliet, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position (Martinus Nijhoff La Haye 1970) 
250.  
36 Lars-Hendrik Röller, ‘Exploitative Abuses’ in Ehlermann and Marquis (eds) (n 9); Lyons (n 
34) 67 et seq; Massimo Motta and Alexander de Streel, ‘Excessive Pricing in Competition 
Law: Never Say Never?’ in Konkurrensverket Swedish Competition Authority (ed) (n 34) 
14; Antonio Robles, ‘Exploitative Prices in European Competition Law’ (10th ASCOLA 
Conference, Tokyo, May 2015) 1, 8; Frederic Jenny, ‘Abuse of dominance by firms 
charging excessive or unfair prices: an assessment’ (2016) 1 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880382> accessed 11 June 2018. 
37 Massimo Motta and Alexander de Streel ‘Excessive Pricing and Price Squeeze under EU 
Law’ in Claus D. Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), What Is an Abuse of Dominant 
Position? (Hart Publishing Oxford 2006) 108; Röller (n 36) 527‒28. 
  
relevance ‒ no effect on the structure of the market ‒38 and that the possibility of a false 
positive is increased.39  
However, EU competition law has undeniably outlawed abusive exploitation of 
dominance in the market; Article 102 (a) expressly prohibits imposing unfair prices and 
trade conditions, as the most blatant form of exploitative abuses. Moreover, if 
exploitative abuses are not the true focus of competition law, why has the relevant 
provision, in cases of abuse of dominance, not been revised, whilst the treaty itself has 
been modified over time? Paragraph 7 of Commission Guidance 2009 on enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 EC40 (102 TFEU) expressly recognized exploitative 
abuses. DG Competition, Blanca Rodriguez Galindo, mentioned that “abusive 
exploitation must, of course, be stopped”.41 In some cases exploitation was explicitly 
mentioned.42 Further, if exclusionary abuses are the only category of abuses that 
                                                 
38 Pınar Akman, ‘Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics?’ (2008) 09-1CCP 
Working Paper 17 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328316> 
accessed 11 June 2018; Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition law: Law and 
Economic Approach (n 7) 228. For explanation of other commentators’ opinions see 
Patrick Hubert and Marie-Laure Combet, ‘Exploitative abuse: The end of the Paradox?’ 
(2011) 1 Concurrences 44. 
39 Akman, ‘Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics?’ (n 38) 16; Jenny (n 36) 36. 
40 Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
(Communication) 2009/C 45/02 (The Guidance). 
41 Blanca Rodriguez Galindo (Directorate-General for Competition), ‘Prohibition of the abuse of 
a dominant position’ (2007) 3 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2007_18_en.pdf> accessed 11 June 
2018. 
42 See e.g. DSD (Case COMP D3/34493) Commission Decision 2001/463/EC [2001] OJ L166/1 
[15]; Deutsche Post AG (Case COMP/C-1/36.915) Commission Decision 2001/892/EC 
[2001] OJ L331/40, paras 155,159 and 167. 
  
deserve intervention, competition law should be indifferent towards many actions by 
state and/or natural monopolies, because there is no possibility of entry in the same 
level of the market. 
Regardless of such complexity in terms of exploitative abuses, abusive 
exploitative conduct vis-à-vis trading partners appears to be different from that in 
relation to final consumers. Although exploitative abuses are directed at both customers 
and final consumers, and a considerable number of commentators have assessed them 
equally, in this regard it may be less justified to consider trading partners in the same 
category as final consumers. Even so, the notion of consumers in the context of EU 
competition law apparently encompasses both intermediary and final consumers.43 
Indeed, trading partners are undertakings competing in the market, so that exploiting 
them may affect the structure of the market and competition. In other words, as is 
evident, the fact that a customer is not competing with a dominant undertaking does not 
imply that it ‒ the customer ‒ is not competing at another level of the market with 
others.  
Although a speech by Neelie Kroes,44 a former European Commissioner, on 
prioritizing exclusionary abuses, has built a basis for opponents of exploitative abuses, 
nevertheless she implied the importance for the EU of exploitation of customers. 
Moreover, she aimed to alter the centre of attention from the outcome (exploitation) to 
                                                 
43 Commission, ‘Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty’ (Communication) 
2004/C 101/08 para 84. 
44 Neelie Kroes, ‘Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82’ (Speech at the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute, New York, 23 September 2005), ‘it is sound for our enforcement 
policy to give priority to so-called exclusionary abuses, since exclusion is often at the 
basis of later exploitation of customers’. 
  
the cause (exclusion).45 At first, it appears rational and effective to do so, but as 
explained above, this approach fails to consider the inverse situation, when exploitation 
of customers may increase the risk of exclusion or dysfunctionality of customers. The 
same approach is reflected by the Japan Fair Trade Commission, although abuse of 
superior bargaining power, without dominance, is objectionable there as well. 
According to their Guidelines on Abuse of a Superior Bargaining Position,46 
exploitative abuses can place transacting parties in a disadvantaged competitive position 
vis-à-vis their competitors, while empowering the abuser against competitors. In France, 
exploitation of customers ‒ even by a powerful undertaking without dominance ‒ can be 
caught by competition law for its effect(s) on the market.47 Hence, if exploitative abuse 
of bargaining power, specifically in cases of “economic dependence”48 could affect the 
market, that of dominance would a fortiori do so. 
The difficulty to draw a clear line between exclusionary and exploitative 
abuses49 may have inspired one author to recognize abuse of a dominant position only 
when both exploitative and exclusionary effects are present.50 This approach considers 
exploitation of trading partners as abuse when ‒ and only when ‒ it leads to exclusion of 
                                                 
45 As some commentators explained that exploitation is a signal of existing problems in the 
market. See Akman, ‘Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics? (n 38) 33. 
46 The Japan Fair Trade Commission, ‘Guidelines Concerning Abuse of Superior Bargaining 
Position under the Antimonopoly Act’ (Tentative Translation, November 30, 2010) I.1. 
47 Bakhoum (n 28) 5, 11. 
48 ibid 9. 
49 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition law (7th Edition, Oxford University Press 
2011) 201‒02. 
50 Akman, ‘Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics?’ (n 38). 
  
those customers.51 This reasoning led that author to settle on the sole importance of 
efficiency vis-à-vis fairness,52 thus disregarding the role of fairness in such cases. 
 However, protecting the market without its actors is meaningless,53 and it is 
abundantly clear from EU case law that maintaining market actors is often understood 
as protecting the process of competition.54 If one claims that protecting the EU internal 
market55 is often misunderstood as that of fairness, the counterclaim would be that the 
EU market itself is based on values such as fairness.56 Moreover, whenever abuse of 
market dominance is involved, the negative effect/s of such abuse (not necessarily 
actual exclusion)57 is/are often58 presupposed, and mere imposition of unreasonable 
                                                 
51 Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economic Approach (n 7) 
220‒22. 
52 ibid 150. The author claims in the book that ‘efficiency’ should be the only goal of EU 
competition law. 
53 See (n 28)  
54 The EU courts and authorities have mentioned equality of opportunity as a prerequisite for “a 
system of undistorted competition”, see e.g. Case C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] 
ECR I-1223 para 51; Case C-462/99 Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197 para 83; Joined 
Cases C-327/03 and C-328/03 ISIS Multimedia and Firma O2 [2005] ECR I-8877 para 39; 
Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008] ECR I-4863 para 51. 
55 Pinar Akman and Luke Garrod, ‘When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?’ (2010) 10/04 CCP 
Working Paper 18 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578181> 
accessed 11 June 2018. In a case of unfair pricing involving British Leyland, the main 
reason according to the authors was limiting internal market trade rather than abusive 
exploitative unfair pricing.  
56 Gerber (n 9) 9, explaining the importance of fairness for the EU internal market.  
57 Case C-95/04 British Airways plc v EC Commission [2007] ECR I-2331, Opinion of AG 
Kokott, para 71, explaining that the mere “likelihood” of negative effect in case of Art 102 
is enough. 
58 The next parts explain the difference in approach depending on whether the customer is 
competing with the dominant undertaking or not. See III.1 and III.2. 
  
trade practices would be enough for application of competition law. Accordingly, it is 
hard to find exploitation of trading partners without the assumption of limiting their 
opportunities to trade and consequently distortion of competition in the ‒ usually 
downstream ‒ market. 
The division between exploitative and exclusionary abuses appears to be less 
reliable in the case of trading partners, since overlap may often occur.59 Accordingly, 
this contribution divides the practical part based on the presence of competition between 
a dominant undertaking and a trading partner, instead of exploitative and exclusionary 
abuse.60 Before launching the next discussion, it is worth recalling that ascertaining 
whether unilateral conduct by a dominant undertaking amounts to abusive conduct is 
allegedly the “most difficult question in competition law”.61 Besides, the border 
between types of abuse is not always explicit, as the same practice could be relevant to 
various abuses.62  
III.1 UTPs vis-à-vis customers without competitive relations 
Article 102 (a) TFEU is the main legal basis for tackling unfair trade conditions 
                                                 
59 The available literature suggests that finding abusive exploitative conduct is very difficult. 
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with a customer in the downstream market, the type of abuse is exclusionary, if not 
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(UTCs)63 imposed on trading partners by a dominant undertaking. The subparagraph 
contains different types of unfair conditions, from pricing to non-pricing and direct to 
indirect imposition, towards all customers and consumers. It does not distinguish 
between situations where competition exists between a dominant undertaking and the 
customer in the downstream market. Nevertheless, case law has established different 
tests and criteria for assessing each situation, corresponding to presence or absence of 
competition between a dominant undertaking and a customer. In addition to Article 102 
(a), Article 102 (c) appears to conform to this part since competition between a 
dominant undertaking and a customer need not be present for abusive discrimination to 
occur. Thus, this part assesses three types of unfair practices, namely unfair pricing 
(excessive price), unfair non-pricing conditions, and discrimination.64 Although unfair 
pricing encompasses unfair low-pricing strategies which primarily target direct 
competitors, only excessive pricing is relevant to this discussion. 
III.1.1 Unfair excessive pricing as an example of UTPs  
Unfair excessive pricing is among the most notorious types of abuse and allegedly 
extremely difficult to prove in practice.65 It has been widely criticized for, inter alia, 
lack of certain legal tests, discouraging the incentive to innovation and investment 
specifically in dynamic industries with a high level of fixed and sunk costs, misleading 
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the competition authorities away from their main task and into the realm of price 
regulation, which they are ill-equipped to deal with, and the ability of the market to self-
correct66. 
 This form of UTC – as an example of UTPs –  has undergone significant 
analysis compared to non-price conditions. The reason may lie in the ease of 
condemning the former, for the above-mentioned reasons, rather than the latter due to 
common opposition to exploitative abuses in the literature. Although some criticisms 
appear to be based on sound reasoning, notable exaggeration67 appears in the difficulty 
of assessing unfair pricing, for the following reasons.  
(1) One strong critique is the complexity of cost-price analysis and the onerous 
burden on competition authorities to undertake this kind of economic analysis. 
However, the Commission has sometimes68 refrained from applying the standard 
complex test;69 indeed, the CJEU, in para. 253 of United Brands, left room for 
manoeuvre in the case of new tests for assessing unfairness of price. Other 
competition authorities, specifically in the UK, have been practicing profound 
cost-price analysis70 proving the possibility of applying just such an analysis. 
Moreover, a consensus prevails among commentators to accept prohibition of 
                                                 
66 For more see David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, ‘Excessive Prices: Using Economics to 
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Economics 97; Lyons (n 34); Röller (n 36); Robles (n 36); Jenny (n 36). 
67 Amelia Fletcher and Alina Jardine, ‘Towards an Appropriate Policy for Excessive Pricing’ in 
Ehlermann and Marquis (eds) (n 9) 541. 
68 Deutsche Post (n 42) para 159. 
69 The CJEU suggested a two-step test in case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 
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unfair pricing only in exceptional situations,71 mainly the existence of a 
monopoly and long-lasting barriers to entry. If cost-price analysis can be applied 
in this situation, why should it not be possible in other situations?72 
Interestingly, the difficulty in determining the costs of dominant undertakings 
has been overstated exclusively in the case of excessive pricing, whilst the same 
analysis is needed, for example, in predatory pricing and as efficient tests,73 
without being equally criticized.74 Besides, the prohibition against unfair pricing 
can act as a preventive,75 ex-ante, measure which would relieve competition 
authorities from the task of complex cost-price analysis. 
(2) In addition to the allegation of practical difficulty, the common belief is that the 
market would self-correct and unfair pricing is in fact positive. However, 
according to game theory, it is ex-post entry prices which can attract potential 
entry rather than ex-ante prices. This is because prices could more likely fall 
after a new entry due to the possibility of predatory pricing by a dominant 
undertaking or the natural reaction of the market to the presence of 
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competition.76 Accordingly, the self-correction claim is not based on sound 
reasoning, and the presence or absence of entry barriers is irrelevant.77 
(3) Pricing control would decrease incentives for innovation and harm dynamic 
efficiency. Although this is the most reliable criticism against prohibition of 
unfair pricing, nevertheless not all markets are dynamic and not all dominant 
undertakings are based on efficiency. Besides, the profit for incentivizing 
innovation is not unlimited. Thus, if excessive profit goes beyond what is 
necessary for innovation, intervention is required.78 Albeit, one question 
remains, namely, how and why should dynamic efficiency be prioritized?  
(4) Undoubtedly, price fixing through cartels or concerted practices is as such anti-
competitive. That being so, then why should prohibition of the same action by 
unilateral intention be substantially different?79  One explanation could be that 
the former directly harms competition, and undertakings are colluding instead of 
doing what they are supposed to do, that is, to compete. However, the main 
cause of prohibition is the results of lack of competition, such as higher prices 
and/or lower quality, not mere collusion and lack of competition.  If we imagine 
an oligopolistic market in which undertakings have decided ‒ their intentions are 
irrelevant ‒ to fix prices at the lowest possible amount,80 something similar to 
the situation of perfect competition, would competition law still be against it? If 
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385, 396. 
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not, the same logic for intervention is present in the case of unfair pricing. The 
ability to impose excessive prices is one of the basic elements for blaming a 
monopoly.81 Similarly, an unfair and unreasonable excessive price imposed by a 
dominant undertaking can be blamed equally. 
Although the Commission has launched few official unfair pricing cases, this 
does not imply total disregard for unfair pricing. Indeed, the Commission has closed 
some unfair pricing cases after price cuts.82 Additionally, the availability of preliminary 
rulings by the CJEU in this regard proves the viability of prohibiting unfair pricing in 
EU competition law.83 The Commission’s recent investigations into excessive/unfair 
pricing confirm such a claim.84 
 Interestingly, in almost all accessible cases, whether formal or informal, 
successful or unsuccessful, excessive price has been raised vis-à-vis trading partners 
                                                 
81 Lyons (n 34) 66. 
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rather than final consumers.85 This indicates the importance of customers’ businesses 
and their opportunities to continue and compete in the market.86 In short, importance of 
B2B UTPs for EU competition law compared to other kinds of UTPs. 
III.1.2 Non-pricing UTCs 
This form of abusive practice appears to be the least discussed in EU competition law. 
The limited literature has predominantly criticized UTCs for lacking competition law 
relevance. Indeed, some commentators suggest other subsets of law, such as contract, 
consumer or unfair competition law, as a proper legal basis for tackling these cases.87 
This part of the article strives to respond to these criticisms, after reviewing some 
important cases and their connection to the notion of “equal opportunity” and UTPs. 
In a preliminary ruling for a case originally raised against SV SABAM and NV 
Fonior, the CJEU emphasized the importance of balance between contracting parties’ 
rights.88 SABAM, a de facto monopoly in copyright management, imposed 
unreasonable/unfair conditions on its members by “demanding the global assignment of 
all copyrights”, even future rights, which lasted five years after withdrawal of 
                                                 
85 See e.g. United Brands (n 69); Case 226/84 British Leyland Public Limited Company v 
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86 As, for example, in Deutsche Post AG, the Commission referred to limiting “opportunities” of 
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membership.89 According to the CJEU, the inclusion in a contract of provisions which 
exceed what is “absolutely necessary” for a dominant undertaking “to carry out its 
activity” could be recognized as UTCs.90  
The Commission adopted a similar approach in GEMA, even though no abuse 
was eventually detected, when “indispensability” and “equity” were introduced as 
tests91 for recognizing the unfairness of conditions. The former demarcates the extent a 
dominant undertaking can burden a contracting party ‒ not beyond what is absolutely 
necessary ‒ while the latter concerns the freedom and opportunity of contracting parties 
not to be inequitably limited.92 The significance of trading partners’ freedom was also 
acknowledged in United Brands.93/94 
The Commission in DSD referred to the principle of “proportionality”, formerly 
established by the CJEU in United Brands,95 in recognizing UTCs.96 DSD, the 
dominant undertaking in the market for collection and recovery of sales packaging, 
licensed its Green Dot trademark to any undertaking willing to join its system. Not only 
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93 (n 69) 253. 
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International SA v Commission [1994 ECR II-755 para 140 upheld in Case C-333/94 P 
Tetra Pak International SA v Commission {1996} ECR I-5951. 
95 (n 69) para190. 
96 DSD (n 42) [6]. 
  
could the licence fee be adjusted unilaterally by the dominant undertaking, but also it 
was “misleading” as irrelevant to actual usage97. In fact, contracting parties were 
supposed to pay a “licence fee for the total quantity of sales packaging carrying the 
Green Dot trade mark”, regardless of the actual usage of DSD’s services.98  
This practice was recognized as disproportionate since the dominant undertaking 
did not have any “reasonable interest in linking the fee payable by its contractual 
partners not to the exemption service actually used but to the extent to which the mark 
is used”.99 Again, the necessity of balancing different parties’ interests was recalled in 
this case,100 as it was in the Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Jacobs in another case 
with comparable facts.101 In this case Sacem, the French copyright management society, 
required discotheques to pay for the “whole repertory, irrespective of the type or 
number of musical works actually used” by them.102 The AG, while emphasizing “a 
clear inequality of bargaining power” between the parties, implied the indispensability 
principle as a proper test for recognizing the unfairness of the term.103 
In addition to “indispensability”, “equity” and “proportionality”, which all 
appear to imply similar connotations, “oppressiveness and one-sidedness”104 can also 
determine the threshold of unfair trade conditions.105 Indeterminacy and lack of 
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104 Akman, ‘Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics?’ (n 38) 19. 
105 In Alsatel v Novasam, the long duration of a rental agreement and the possibility of 
recommencing “with its initial duration”, a penalty clause for termination limiting the 
  
transparency in the discount system were found to be abusive UTCs in Michelin, where 
customers were left uncertain about obtaining a discount.106 
 One-sidedness appeared in the Microsoft standard licensing agreement with PC 
manufacturers. The long duration of the agreement, requiring licensees “to pay for 
minimum numbers of copies of a product regardless of actual use” and paying royalties 
for production of every PC item, were regarded as abusive.107 In AAMS v Commission, 
limiting a trading partner’s opportunities to launch new cigarette brands via a time-limit 
for introducing new cigarettes, limiting their ability to increase monthly quantities of 
cigarettes and disproportionate inspections, were found to be abusive terms in a 
distribution agreement.108 
Despite the existence of these cases noted above and the applicability of EU 
competition law for hindering UTCs imposed on trading partners, a shadow of doubt 
remains in the literature as to such applicability.109 According to the following, UTCs 
imposed by dominant undertakings should be dealt with under EU competition law. 
(1) The CJEU expressly stated in Hoffmann-La Roche that Article 102 TFEU 
“aimed in fact at situations which clearly originate in contractual relations”.110 
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the European Communities [2001] ECR II-03413 paras 24, 64 and 83. 
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Accordingly, it should be no surprise if common features are found in both 
competition and contract law, however different their aims might be. 
(2) Existing directives and regulations on unfair contract terms in the EU 
exclusively apply in relation to final consumers. Significantly, unfair 
competition law, as introduced in some Member States, is essentially incapable 
of protecting against UTPs. Unfair competition law ‒ “passing off” in common 
law systems ‒ originally aimed to safeguard the targets of unregistered 
trademarks against consumer confusion and deception.111 Even so, in both 
common law and  ‒ especially ‒  civil law systems the term has been expanded 
and covers a wider range of unlawful practices, from “deceptive advertising”, 
“counterfeit of non-protected products” and “trade secrets” to “predatory 
pricing”.112 Hence, it mostly affects advertising and commercial practices, the 
origin of goods and services and replicas of competitors’ goods or services, 
rather than UTCs as introduced above.113 
(3) The Commission, after almost a decade, is still struggling with the situation of 
B2B UTPs in the food supply chain. Despite the significance of the subject 
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matter, no binding regulation has been enacted so far. Not only the Commission 
but also the Parliament have published various documents114 in this regard and 
the issue appears to be still on the agenda. Various factors have raised concern 
for B2B UTCs. These include, for example, fear factors115 (preventing SMEs 
from complaining), increasing costs of trading partners,116 decreasing 
productivity and incentives to invest, hindering cross-border investments and 
even reducing economic efficiency.117 The important question that arises is that 
if the actions of a non-dominant undertaking which merely enjoys superior 
bargaining power could raise such concerns, how is it that similar practices by a 
dominant undertaking do not deserve enforcement via competition law? In other 
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words, all necessary elements to prevent customers from effective competition 
among themselves are present even if no dominant undertaking is involved; 
thus, if a dominant undertaking were involved, their functionality and 
opportunity to compete would a fortiori be limited.  
 Due to its ability to control the market, a dominant undertaking could 
systematically practice UTCs with a substantial number ‒ if not all ‒ of its trading 
partners.118 This capacity may have freed the hands of competition law to 
intervene even in cases of unfair pricing, whereas the current directive on unfair 
contract terms in B2C relations expressly excludes “adequacy of the price and 
remuneration”.119 Indeed, the relevance of the issue to competition law is to the 
extent that if unfair practices by a non-dominant undertaking could affect trade 
between Member States, which normally is not the case, EU competition law 
would appear to intervene.  
(4) The dysfunctionality of contract law, due to the high costs of dispute resolution 
through litigation and the fear factor, has not only led to actions by the EU 
authorities as mentioned, but also forced many Member States to appoint 
“different national enforcement authorities to address UTPs”.120 Thus, how 
could we expect contract law to address the issue in cases of dominance? Public 
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enforcement appeared to be a better substitute than private enforcement, since 
“Member States with public enforcement had no cases in the last few years”.121 
(5)  Moreover, some Member States have already modified their competition law to 
address the issue of inequality of bargaining power, even without dominance, as 
well.122 If the EU already incurred the cost of establishing and developing a 
system of public enforcement and building procedural experience, why should it 
not use available resources for UTPs by dominant undertakings, since the 
Commission has not foreseen regulatory action, for offline markets123, so far?124 
III.1.3 Discrimination vis-à-vis customers as an example of UTPs 
Like UTCs, discriminatory practices vis-à-vis trading partners have received strong 
criticism. Despite the explicitness of Article 102 (c) in identifying discrimination as a 
form of abuse of a dominant position, many economists have recognized positive and 
procompetitive effects of discrimination, specifically when it increases output, enhances 
economies of scale and scope and assists in covering fixed and sunk costs.125 However, 
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the possibility of negative effects has always been anticipated, too.126  
The wording of Article 102 (c) indicates discrimination against trading 
partners,127 even though other kinds of discrimination have also been recognized.128 
Two important factors make Article 102 (c) abusive, firstly, applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions ‒ or similar conditions to non-equivalent 
transactions;129 and secondly, placing trading partners at a competitive disadvantage. 
Assessing when, and according to what criteria, transactions are in fact equivalent and 
what constitutes a “competitive disadvantage” fall outside of the scope of this article.130 
What is relevant here is the importance of fairness131 for market actors as a pivotal basis 
for the prohibition against discrimination. 
Equal opportunity to trade is not only inferred according to the wording of 
Article 102 (c), competitive disadvantage, but relevant case law also indicates the same 
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meaning. Indeed, discrimination appears to be the most transparent form of abuse 
implying equality of opportunity. For instance, the Commission in Alpha Flight 
Services related equality of opportunity132 ‒ as a requirement for “a system of 
undistorted competition” ‒ to prohibition of discrimination.133 Moreover, AG Kokott 
recognized Article 82 (c) EC (102 (c) TFEU) as “an expression of the general principle 
of equal treatment”.134 
 The CJEU in United Brands,135 the court of first instance in Tetra Pak,136 and 
the Commission in Portuguese airports,137 referred to competitive disadvantage as the 
result of discriminatory treatment. In this context, equality of opportunity, the principle 
of equal treatment and competitive disadvantage appear to embrace the same idea. This 
idea does not pertain to the level of efficiency of market actors, trading partners, but to 
prohibition of distorting their chance to be, and compete, in the market. 
Even if one claims that most decided 102 (c) cases concerned “protectionist or 
market partitioning effects”,138 this does not rebut the significance of equality of 
opportunity in those cases. The possibility that state-owned dominant undertakings have 
a greater tendency to discriminate in favour of national customers should not cast doubt 
on the enforceability of Article 102 (c) TFEU, and deemed as discrimination based on 
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mere nationality, irrelevant to competition law.139 Indeed, the basis of discrimination, 
which here is nationality, is the cause of and the motive for actions resulting in a 
competitive disadvantage. Hence, competition law and Article 102 (c) should indeed be 
involved to tackle unfair outcomes.  
Equally, the presence of a ban on arbitrage and partitioning the internal market 
in some cases140 does not downgrade the need to protect equal opportunities for trade. 
Firstly, preventing arbitrage is generally the prerequisite for successful 
discrimination,141 secondly, disapproval of partitioning the market does not preclude 
that of unequal treatment. In other words, it is a false presumption to conclude that 
discrimination is found abusive merely due to partitioning the internal market, and 
competitive disadvantage alone could not constitute abusive discrimination. 
Significantly, many commentators142 have criticized the procedure of the EU 
courts and Commission for disregarding assessment of competitive disadvantage in 
many cases.143 Discriminatory treatment was found abusive even where customers were 
not actually competing in the same market. According to the Commission, “Article 82 
(102) may be applied even in the absence of a direct effect on competition between 
undertakings on any given market”.144 In so claiming, the Commission referred to the 
CJEU, according to which Article 82 (102) includes a non-exhaustive list.  
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Although the procedure appears to be more protectionist than expected, the 
possibility to become competitors within the internal market should not be overlooked. 
Indeed, a discriminatory practice targeting customers which are not currently competing 
with each other can preclude their potentiality to do so in the future. This consideration 
may have resulted in prohibiting many discriminatory cases so far. 
All in all, the three abusive practices discussed possess the following common 
features. Firstly, in almost145 all available cases, abusive practices were condemned in 
relation to customers active in a level of the market rather than in relation to consumers. 
This implies the importance of equality of opportunity as a reliable basis for finding 
abusive treatment. In all cases, the ability of trading partners to compete and act 
properly in the market was in a sense distorted. In other words, these practices can 
restrict competition, though mainly in downstream markets, and form UTPs. 
Moreover, the level of efficiency of customers exposed to UTCs and 
discriminatory treatment was not an issue for assessment. Accordingly, the mere fact of 
imposition of unfair and discriminatory conditions by a dominant undertaking is 
assumed to legitimize intervention. In other words, the presence of an abusive practice, 
as a deviation from competition on the merit, appears to capture more attention than the 
actual effects of such a practice, although negative effects on customers are usually 
assumed.  Indeed, a dominant undertaking is often an unavoidable trading partner for 
customers which may have no other choice but to accept unfair conditions.  
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III.2 UTPs vis-à-vis customers with competitive relation 
UTPs could embrace a wide range of activities including refusal to supply and margin 
squeeze, which are normally categorized as exclusionary abuse of a dominant 
position.146As explained before,147 this article does not distinguish between exploitative 
and exclusionary abuses against trading partners. Accordingly, this part of the article 
discusses practices not usually considered UTPs in competition law. The reason for 
doing so is twofold. Firstly, practices such as refusal to supply cause similar ‒ although 
usually more aggressive and onerous ‒ effects on customers. Hence, constructive refusal 
to supply basically consists of practices, such as excessive pricing,148 discussed before. 
Secondly, some examples of UTPs, mentioned in available documents in this regard,149 
are comparable with refusal to supply.150 
III.2.1 Refusal to supply as an example of UTPs 
Refusal to supply according to case law and the Commission151 is almost152 always a 
case of vertically integrated dominant undertakings competing with their customers in 
the downstream market. Refusal to supply is an interesting case proving the special 
responsibility of a dominant undertaking by limiting its freedom to choose trading 
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148 Jones and Sufrin (n 34) 510. 
149 See (n 114) 
150 e.g. unilaterally terminating a commercial relationship. 
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partners to create equal opportunities for market actors.153 In fact, ownership in the EU 
encompasses “certain social duties”,154 specifically when the owner occupies a 
dominant position.   
However, for the sake of balancing different rights, refusal to supply is abusive 
only when the cumulative criteria are fulfilled.155Accordingly, the need arises to prove 
necessity and indispensability of the product/service “to compete effectively in a 
downstream market”, without which effective competition would be eliminated, thus 
harming consumers. Especially when IPRs are involved and the owner is forced to issue 
a licence, due care is needed to protect the incentive to innovate in future.  
The borderline for intervention is drawn where the opportunity for downstream 
competitors to compete substantially depends on supply by a dominant undertaking. 
Although the criteria mentioned imply a relatively high threshold for assessing abusive 
refusal to supply, available case law, for the following reasons, demonstrates a tendency 
towards protecting equality of opportunity than dominant undertakings’ property rights.  
(1) Case law does not provide actual assessment for efficiency concerns as to 
whether maintaining a downstream competitor is welfare-enhancing or not.156 In 
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other words, if a product/service is deemed indispensable, exclusion of 
competitors, whether as or even less efficient157 is usually presumed. 
(2) Elimination of effective competition should not be interpreted as actual 
elimination of competitor(s) ‒ “It is sufficient that the rivals are disadvantaged 
and consequently compete less aggressively”.158  
(3) It appears that, at least in non-IPR cases, the risk of eliminating one downstream 
competitor, one that asked for supply, would be enough.159 In a reference for a 
preliminary ruling, the CJEU recognized refusal to supply if there is a 
“possibility of eliminating all competition from another undertaking”.160  
(4) Additionally, the standard for detecting abuse is considerably lower in the case 
of terminating an existing business relationship, imposing a duty to supply by 
specific regulations, or achieving dominance through “special or exclusive 
rights”, such as state financing.161 
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(5) Even when an IPR is involved, not only could a dominant owner be forced to 
supply, but it is also obliged to license based on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory conditions.162 
III.2.2 Margin squeeze as an example of UTPs 
Margin squeeze is another form of abusive practice where an upstream163 dominant 
undertaking competes with its customers in a downstream market. Prohibition of this 
form of abusive practice appears to be based on equal opportunity for market actors as 
well.164 In margin squeeze, the dominant undertaking ‒ either by charging a high 
wholesale price (to its customers), or charging a low retail price (to end users, 
consumers) and even both strategies ‒ practically leaves a “negative or insufficient” 
margin for a downstream competitor to compete.165 It is not necessary for each price, 
wholesale or retail, to be unfair, excessive or predatory; because what makes it abusive 
is “the unfairness of the spread between” two prices.166 Indeed, such a squeeze of 
margin is capable of making competition for downstream undertakings either 
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impossible or more difficult.167 
 Besides, proving a concrete anti-competitive effect is not required, so that 
merely demonstrating potential effect is sufficient.168 Although the Commission 
discussed this together with refusal to supply,169 which implies the former as the subset 
of the latter, the CJEU has expressed a different view.170 Accordingly, margin squeeze 
should be interpreted as a separate abuse without the need to assess refusal to supply 
criteria. Again, here the scales of EU courts have tilted toward protection of equal 
opportunities for trade. 
Both case law and Commission guidance have demonstrated that such protection 
is for trade opportunities of “at least as efficient competitors”.171 Therefore, if the 
difference between wholesale and retail prices is enough for a dominant undertaking 
and its ‘as efficient’ competitors to compete, without incurring loss or making no profit, 
intervention is less likely. In other words, the opportunity of an inefficient competitor 
with relatively high production costs would not be protected. In any case, inefficient 
undertakings may have to leave the market, in the long run at any rate, even in the 
absence of a dominant undertaking.  
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However, it should be borne in mind that it is normal for new entrants to 
produce less efficiently. Thus, considering the current situation of undertakings would 
not always be a reliable basis.172 A competitor may always become as efficient “within a 
reasonable period”, whereas abusive practices by a dominant undertaking could hinder 
it from doing so.173 Hence, an over-strict approach toward the ‘as efficient’ test can 
cause unfair outcomes by undue prevention of equality of opportunity. 
Considering various kinds of UTPs against trading partners, with and without 
competitive relations with the dominant undertaking, demonstrated a key difference 
regarding each situation. Legal proceedings of the courts and Commission appear to be 
noticeably stricter against UTPs when the dominant undertaking is not competing with 
its customers in the same level of the market, usually downstream. In these cases, as 
noted earlier, actions by the dominant undertaking are required to be indispensable, 
proportionate, transparent and equitable, without considering the level of efficiency of 
customers targeted by UTPs.  
Indeed, here the dominant undertaking is not usually forced to do something in 
favour of trading partners, such as supplying raw material, but it is obliged not to 
abusively impose unreasonable, unfair and disproportionate conditions on one or more 
customers. Although a transaction is, at any rate, involved in the present case, where 
one side, usually the dominant undertaking, supplies goods/services to the other, it is 
actually normal business behaviour without which production would be meaningless. 
However, when a dominant undertaking’s subsidiary is active in the downstream 
market, refusal to supply other customers is a meaningful strategy. Here, conversely, the 
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threshold for finding abuse is stricter, because the dominant undertaking is forced to do 
something for customers.  
IV. UTPs in Digital Markets 
Rapid expansion of internet usage and its significant role in different aspects of our 
lives, from leisure and entertainment to conducting daily purchases and launching 
lucrative businesses, have propelled the EU to initiate a massive project known as the 
“Digital Single Market” (DSM). Indeed, a real EU single market will never exist if the 
growing online market is neglected. In May 2015 the EU Commission published its 
DSM Strategy for Europe, in which it predetermined 16 different legislative and/or non-
legislative initiatives for creation of the EU digital market.174 “Analysis of the role of 
Platforms” was included in the DSM agenda, due to their pivotal role and power in the 
online economy.175  Because the issue of UTPs was raised in online platform-business 
relations, the following focuses solely on this matter.176 
Online platforms can be described as the “engine[s]”177 of the digital market, 
creating value by connecting two distinct, but interrelated, users and acting as a gateway 
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for many businesses to access the market.178 Although it is for lawyers to propose a 
specified definition of legal concepts for the sake of legal certainty, no consensus so far 
exists on a comprehensive, inclusive and exclusive definition of online platforms.179 
Economists have largely adopted the term two-or multi-sided market instead of 
platforms.180  
Albeit the predominant focus of this contribution is on a substantive inquiry into 
competition law enforcement, it is nevertheless useful to briefly overview the 
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economics of online platforms and associated challenges for competition law 
enforcement.  
IV.1 Economics of Online Platforms 
Certain common features among most platforms, if not all, distinguish them from 
conventional, one-sided markets. Online platforms are mainly characterized by an 
indirect network effect, that is, increase in the value of the platform for one side if the 
number of users on the other side rises. Platforms, by acting as an intermediary, create a 
bridge between two groups of users, such as sellers and buyers on eBay and facilitate, 
for example, a transaction or communication181 which may not otherwise have 
happened at all or as conveniently. By so doing, they “facilitate the realization of 
indirect network” effect.182  
For the sake of profit maximization or even profit making, platforms need to 
manipulate the price structure to internalize the existing network effect. Accordingly, 
one side, with higher price elasticity of demand which values the presence of the other 
side less or even nil, is charged lower or even zero, and vice versa.183 This is the 
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primary reason behind the non-neutral price structure of many business models adopted 
by online platforms.184 
These specifications, which are neither utterly new nor specific only to the 
online sphere,185 have raised various challenges for competition authorities, especially 
in terms of assessing market power and defining the market. Considering the presence 
of at least two different sides, how many markets should be defined? Does the number 
of markets relate to the type of platforms, such as transaction and non-transaction ones? 
What is the proper test for defining the market? Can the SSNIP test (small but 
significant non-transitory increase in price), which is predominantly based on price 
analysis, work here? What is/are proper alternative/s? Would offline and online markets 
be substitutes? If the network effect leads to a “winner-takes-all” situation and 
competition turns to be “for the market” rather than in the market, can market share 
alone properly signify the amount of power? The only clear-cut statement that can be 
made here is that this contribution will not examine these issues,186 since the focus is 
rather on the type of abuse. 
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Another controversial factor, discussed extensively in the literature, is the role of 
big data in boosting the market power of a few online platforms. Three different 
viewpoints are distinguishable in this regard. Firstly, big data, gathering, maintaining, 
processing and use of data, plays a substantial role in achieving dominance and even 
monopoly/quasi-monopoly in new markets.187 Secondly, big data would rather drive 
competition than concentration, and data is effortlessly accessible, for example, through 
data brokers.188 Thirdly, big data could in some circumstances create competition law 
concerns, while in other situations it may facilitate competition.189 
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Regardless of all disparities in opinions, it is nonetheless possible to 
acknowledge that the characteristics of new business models ‒ such as the indirect 
network effect, lock-in effect, the role of big data, economies of scope and scale ‒ tend 
to concentration.190/191 Hence, few operating giants could act as “gatekeepers”.192 This 
issue increases the possibility of abusing market power, imposing unfair trade terms and 
engaging in UTPs, especially in relation to businesses. 
IV.2 UTPs in the online environment and competition law 
Almost all contributors concur that the rules, not tools, of competition law are flexible 
and competent enough to deal with competition law concerns of the new economy.193 
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Moreover, the Commission, in one of its latest publications in this regard, expressly 
affirmed the applicability of EU competition law to UTPs in platform-business 
relations.194/195 The Commission has regarded competition law as the “main baseline” 
for tackling UTPs, while it has considered other potential alternatives, either soft or hard 
law, as well. However, if a new approach commences, competition law would 
nevertheless apply when a dominant undertaking is involved.196 
The Commission eventually proposed a regulation, hard law, concerning 
fairness and transparency in platform-business relations. In fact, many types of UTPs 
are/can be practiced by even non-dominant platforms when businesses are dependent on 
platforms197. Besides, “the current regulatory framework [competition law] may not be 
effective in preventing some of these practices, nor in providing effective redress”.198 
It appears that the Commission may have realized the need for an ex-ante 
approach to enhance transparency in platform-business relations. The proposal provides 
some binding guidelines for online platforms. It aims not only to prevent, ex-ante, 
common unfair practices, but also to guide the business environment in the context of 
online platforms as a “new”, “expanding” and “less-regulated” phenomenon. Otherwise, 
as mentioned before, the main baseline for tackling UTPs, in relation to businesses, is 
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nevertheless EU competition law. The new regulatory proposal is just a complementary 
means, which leaves the application of competition law unaffected.199 
   The original objective of acting against UTPs, according to the Commission, is 
to “ensure a fair and innovation-friendly platform economy”.200 It would, inter alia, 
secure “a predictable business environment” and “effective[ly] redress possibilities”, 
enhance “the general level of trust” and “transparency”, and limit “abuse of 
dependencies”.201 It appears less justifiable why the Commission has raised the issue of 
UTPs in the online environment separately. As mentioned, objectives should be 
desirable in all different forms of market, whether online or offline, one-sided or multi-
sided.202 However, the Commission appears to recognize UTPs by online platforms as 
more crucial, due to the “cross-border nature of the online service” and the unlimited 
geographical market, which magnifies the need for a less fragmented approach in the 
EU.203 
Examples of UTPs might differ, depending on the types of market and business 
models; however, the yardstick according to the EU competition law is the same. That 
is, to protect against unequal bargaining power, and to provide equal opportunity for all 
market actors and balance between different parties’ rights.204 Since the predominant 
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focus of this contribution is on UTPs according to EU competition law, assessment of 
the new regulatory proposal falls outside the scope of the present discussion. 
So far, only a few cases have been raised by the Commission. None of these has 
proceeded to the EU courts, either due to preliminary settlements and commitment 
decisions, or just being in the early stages. The following offers an overview of these 
cases. Since the nature and type of practices are highly controversial, no specific 
categorization is provided. 
Arguably, one of the most common205 UTPs in the online environment, 
especially in the price comparison and hotel booking markets, is the “parity” or “most-
favoured-nation” clause. Although they are not limited to online markets, it is more 
convenient to control compliance with the clause in the online sphere. Parity clauses 
require trading partners to treat with their business party, platforms, as favourably as 
they do with other platforms. Accordingly, all or some terms and conditions of the 
transaction, normally the price, should be either better or at least equal to the same 
transactions with others.206 These clauses limit the ability of businesses to differentiate 
the price of their products/services offered on each intermediary platform, in short, 
selling cheaply elsewhere.  
The extent of limitation depends on the type of clause. A wide parity clause 
forbids offering better conditions on all or most available alternatives, including other 
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platforms, while a narrow parity clause merely targets a business’s own website or 
offline distribution channel.207 
The positive and efficient effects of these clauses, such as hindering freeriding 
and reducing transaction costs,208 are indeed inconsiderable compared to their negative 
effects. Parity clauses, specifically wide ones, can “exploit suppliers and exclude 
competitors”.209 A platform can charge its trading partner a higher fee, such as a 
commission fee, while the other party is unable to increase the price of its 
product/service on the platform due to the parity clause. Hence, it may, in extreme 
situations, leave the platform and even the market.210 Indeed, the difference in 
bargaining power between the platform and the trading partner increases the likelihood 
of imposing the clause.211 Besides, the higher the power of the platform, the higher 
would be the negative effects.212 Trading partners have no choice but to accept the 
clause, otherwise platforms could threaten to delist them and block their access to the 
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platform.213 Other potential negative effects are associated with parity clauses, such as 
barriers to entry for new platforms, which are not dealt with here.214  
Almost all Member States, due to the presence of an agreement between parties, 
have recognized parity clauses as collusion. However, they have merely condemned the 
platform, that is, only one side of the “collusion”. This could imply that the underlying 
reason for condemning these clauses is in fact abuse of dominance rather than collusion. 
However, convicting merely the powerful side signifies the presence of power and the 
forcible nature of the agreement.215 Accordingly, some scholars, referring to the genuine 
agency model, consider Article 102 TFEU more relevant than Article 101.216 In 
addition, the Commission in its investigation of parity clauses by Amazon, appeared to 
refer to Article 102 TFEU rather than Article 101.217 Article 102 (a) could be the most 
relevant provision in these cases. 
Google-Android could218 also be considered an interesting case from the 
standpoint of legal evaluation of UTPs. According to the Commission, Google “abused 
its dominant position by imposing restrictions on Android device manufacturers and 
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mobile network operators”.219 The Commission has recognized Google as dominant in 
three different markets, that is, general search, the licensable version of Android and 
app stores for Android. Although Android is offered for free, some important Google 
applications, YouTube and App Store ‒ which have no substitute ‒ require a licence 
agreement.  
Google required device manufacturers (DM) to sign two different agreements in 
order to qualify for installing and obtaining a licence for App Store and YouTube. The 
first was a mobile Application Distribution Agreement, by which DMs must preinstall 
all Google applications, including those with many substitutes, and even set them as a 
default app. The second was an Anti-Fragmentation Agreement, which prohibits DMs 
from installing other versions of Android than that developed by Google. Forcing DMs 
to agree to these terms restricts their opportunities to trade by “constraining their 
options, reducing their secondary revenue sources, and limiting their ability to 
distinguish themselves from competitors”.220 
Another interesting case in this regard is Google’s Comparison Shopping 
service, which recently resulted in a Commission decision and imposition of a massive 
fine.221 By contrast, a similar investigation in the USA found “a legitimate business 
justification” in Google’s conduct.222 According to the Commission, Google abused its 
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dominance by systematically favouring the position of its own Comparison Shopping 
Service in its general search results.223 Hence, Google artificially gained traffic by 
“reduc[ing] the opportunities for Google's [vertical] competitors”.224 However, previous 
versions of the same service, such as Google Product and Froogle, for which Google 
did not engage in similar favouring practices, were comparatively unsuccessful.225 
Apart from some articles commissioned by Google, which robustly defended 
Google’s conduct,226 the form of abuse is indeed controversial.227 A new type of abuse, 
based on the non-exhaustive list of Article 102, discrimination, refusal to supply and 
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tying could allegedly be a proper type of abuse in this case.228 Although there is no need 
to fit abuse into any established form, the characteristics of the present case appear to be 
similar to those of discrimination (Art. 102 (c)).  
Google applied a different algorithm to its own service and by doing so placed 
its vertical competitors, trading partners, at a competitive disadvantage. Some authors 
argued that Article 102 (c) concerns merely discrimination vis-à-vis trading partners, 
not the dominant undertaking itself.229 However, if a dominant undertaking cannot 
privilege one trading partner over another, it a fortiori cannot do the same for its own 
subsidiary.230 A similar basis exists in the case of margin squeeze, where an upstream 
dominant undertaking cannot charge its vertical competitors more than its own 
subsidiary so as to leave no margin for them to compete in the downstream market. 
Besides, in some cases discrimination in favour of a subsidiary falls under Article 102 
(c).231 
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Moreover, a transaction indeed exists between Google and a website that makes 
them trading partners of Google.232 Firstly, websites have to comply with Google’s 
Webmaster Guidelines ‒ otherwise they could even be removed from Google’s index.233 
Secondly, an exchange ‒ give-and-take ‒ exists between Google and website-based 
businesses. Google provides visibility for websites, while websites increase the value 
and quality of Google search results. Indeed, the more comprehensive Google’s search 
results are, the more users and eventually advertisers, meaning revenue, Google would 
earn. Thirdly, a trading party has a broader meaning than contracting party.234 
Google is indeed under Commission scrutiny for other potential abuses, such as 
restrictions on data portability, exclusionary contracts, copying rivals’ content.235 These 
practices predominantly target its competitors, hence less likely to fall within abusive 
UTPs. 
Online platforms, specifically those with high market power, could easily abuse 
their role as “gatekeeper” and intermediary by practicing UTPs against businesses. If 
privacy and data usage issues are the biggest challenge in relation to consumers, UTPs 
are indeed the most important matter in platform-business relations. The more a 
platform enjoys the existence of a strong network effect, popularity among consumers 
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and lack of multi-homing,236 the more it could impose UTPs on businesses. It may not 
make any business sense to restrict consumers. Instead, by satisfying them and having 
them on the platform, restricting and exploiting businesses becomes easier. Businesses, 
generally speaking, appear to have less potential for multi-homing, especially if the 
platform is satisfactory and beyond in the eyes of consumers. Significantly, smaller 
businesses might not be able to achieve the same reputation on an alternative, if any, 
platform.237 
V. Conclusion 
Reviewing the relevant legal documents, case law and doctrines implies that “equal 
opportunity to trade” could be the most plausible understanding of fairness in the 
context of EU competition law. The relevant EU competition cases on UTPs imply that 
the direct concern is almost always businesses rather than consumers.238 However, it 
should be borne in mind that this interpretation, “equal opportunity to trade”, 
predominantly concerns businesses, not final consumers. Hence, a different explanation 
might apply to consumer-related fairness. Similarly, other competition law systems may 
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interpret fairness differently.239  
As a rule, the presence of disparity in bargaining power between different sides 
makes UTPs distinguishable from other practices such as unfair competition, when 
power and/or dominance let the superior party limit the other side’s opportunity to 
trade. This important factor, in addition to clarifying the notion of UTPs, could play a 
significant role in distinguishing different types of abusive conduct, (Article 102). 
Accordingly, EU competition law would better classify different abuses based 
on the object of abuse. Thus, if it is the trading partner of the dominant undertaking 
whose opportunity to trade has been distorted, the abuse can be called UTP, or B2B 
UTP. UTPs form an umbrella term to cover variety of condemned practices and 
imposition of unfair terms. Although this broad definition of UTP, in the context of EU 
competition law, results in including a variety of practices, it could nevertheless relieve 
EU competition lawyers from the traditional, misleading and unreliable “exploitative 
and exclusionary” divisions.240  
EU competition law is a reliable and efficient legal basis for tackling various ‒ if 
not all ‒ types of B2B UTPs, as the relevant proceedings and the Commission have 
demonstrated and emphasized. However, the EU lacks a harmonized approach in terms 
of abuse of dependency ‒ without dominance. The Commission periodically happens to 
notice a need for action, as when the farmers’ crisis took place241 or recently the digital 
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single market strategy raised the question of UTPs in platform-business relations. The 
latter resulted in regulatory action, while the destiny of the former remains unclear.242 
Considering that UTPs are not limited to the food supply chain and platform-business 
relations, the Commission should take more inclusive and harmonized steps. Moreover, 
it might be more helpful if EU competition law could even be able to intervene in some 
cases of abuse without dominance if trade between Member States is affected.  
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